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INTRODUCTION1
When a trial is over, and if permitted by statute, the winning party
will often ask the court to grant attorney’s fees. Likely, the judge will
not decide the claim for attorney’s fees at that time, but instead, will
enter an order deciding only the merits of the substantive claims. This
leaves the issue of attorney’s fees undecided and reserved for a later
decision. What should the losing party do? Can the losing party
immediately appeal the decision on the merits? Or must the losing party
wait to appeal until the judge decides the pending attorney’s fees claim?
Historically, North Carolina case law in this area has been unclear at
best. Recently, however, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has
taken great strides to clarify the law determining when a judgment is
final. Recent decisions have brought clarity to the law, allowing
practitioners to file timely appeals and enabling judges to issue more
uniform decisions regarding the appealability of pending claims for
attorney’s fees.
Generally, the right to appeal from the ruling of a trial court is
granted only by statute.2 The North Carolina General Statutes specify,
with a few exceptions, that a party has the right to appeal from the final
judgment of a trial court directly to the Court of Appeals of North
Carolina.3 If no right of appeal is present in the statutes, the appellate
court, on its own motion, must dismiss the appeal, even if a party has
not raised the question of appealability.4 Although the basics of
appellate civil procedure are sufficiently spelled out in the statutes and
explained in case law, the ambiguity regarding terms such as “final” and
“interlocutory” make it difficult to ensure that a judgment is actually
1. The Author would like to thank Professor Matthew W. Sawchak for
recommending the topic of this Comment and for inspiring dedication to writing it. His
thoughtful advice and support were invaluable during the writing process.
2. Veazey v. City of Durham, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (N.C. 1950).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27 (2013).
4. Bailey v. Gooding, 270 S.E.2d 431, 433 (N.C. 1980).
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“final” before filing an appeal. This is even more evident when a judge
has issued an order on the merits that resolves all of the substantive
issues of the claim, but leaves a claim for attorney’s fees pending.
This Comment focuses on the jurisprudence surrounding the
finality and appealability of an order that determines the merits of a
claim but leaves a claim for attorney’s fees unresolved. The legal
landscape surrounding this issue in North Carolina has recently
undergone drastic changes to resolve much of the confusion and
contradiction.
Part I begins with an introduction to general appellate procedure
and explains what makes an appeal untimely or interlocutory. Part II
describes the two major ideological approaches in reaching such
determinations and shows how other jurisdictions decide whether a
merits order is final, and therefore, immediately appealable when an
unresolved claim for attorney’s fees remains. Part III traces the modern
changes to the landscape of that same question in North Carolina.
Finally, Part IV analyzes the recent Supreme Court of North Carolina
decision in Duncan v. Duncan,5 which has entirely changed the analysis
for unresolved claims regarding attorney’s fees in North Carolina. The
final Part of this Comment identifies some of the questions and issues
that remain after the Duncan decision.
I.

GENERAL APPELLATE PROCEDURE

An order from a trial court is considered either “final” or
“interlocutory.”6 A final order “disposes of the cause as to all the parties,
leaving nothing to be judicially determined between them in the trial
court.”7 A final order is, therefore, immediately appealable to the Court
of Appeals of North Carolina.8 An interlocutory order, on the other
hand, “is one made during the pendency of an action, which does not
dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in
order to settle and determine the entire controversy.”9 There is no
general right in the North Carolina General Statutes to immediately
appeal an interlocutory order.10 The rationale for the rule against
interlocutory appeals is to “prevent fragmentary, premature and

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Duncan v. Duncan (Duncan II), 742 S.E.2d 799 (N.C. 2013).
Veazey, 57 S.E.2d at 381.
Id. (citing Sanders v. May, 91 S.E. 526, 527 (N.C. 1917)).
Id.
Id. (citing Johnson v. Roberson, 88 S.E. 231, 231–32 (N.C. 1916)).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27 (2013).
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By dismissing fragmented interlocutory
unnecessary appeals[.]”11
appeals, the whole case will be presented to the appellate court in a
single appeal from a final determination by the trial court.12
There are, however, limited circumstances when parties can
immediately appeal from an interlocutory order.13 The two most
common exceptions to the rule against interlocutory appeals are the
substantial right doctrine and the Rule 54(b) certification for immediate
appeal.14 First, the North Carolina General Statutes grant the right to
appeal directly to the court of appeals when an interlocutory order:
(1) affects a substantial right;
(2) effectually determines the action and prevents a later judgment from
which an appeal may be taken;
(3) discontinues the action; or
(4) grants or refuses a new trial for a party.15

Second, Rule 54(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure
allows a trial court to certify as “final” a “judgment as to one or more but
fewer than all of the claims or parties” in an action for immediate appeal
“only if there is no just reason for delay.”16
A. The Substantial Right Doctrine
Although the substantial right doctrine is not the subject of this
Comment, a brief explanation may be helpful to understand one way to
appeal from an interlocutory order of a trial court. The Supreme Court
of North Carolina describes the substantial right test as “more easily
stated than applied.”17 The particular facts of each case and the
procedural history must be analyzed to determine if a party’s substantial
right has been affected, allowing for an immediate appeal.18 The party
appealing must show: “(1) the judgment affects a right that is
substantial; and (2) the deprivation of that substantial right will
potentially” injure the party if not corrected before an appeal from the

11. Waters v. Qualified Pers., Inc., 240 S.E.2d 338, 343 (N.C. 1978).
12. Id. (quoting Raleigh v. Edwards, 67 S.E.2d 669, 671 (N.C. 1951)).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(b)(3).
14. See Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 444 S.E.2d 252, 253 (N.C. Ct. App.
1994).
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(b)(3); see also id. § 1-277.
16. N.C. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (turning an interlocutory order that is not immediately
appealable into a final order that is immediately appealable).
17. Waters, 240 S.E.2d at 343.
18. Id.
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final judgment.19 “[T]he right to immediate appeal is reserved for those
cases in which the normal course of procedure is inadequate to protect
the substantial right affected” by the judgment.20
The North Carolina General Assembly did not define the phrase
“substantial right” in the statute that creates the right to appeal;21 instead,
the courts must attempt to interpret this important phrase. Because
there is no precise definition, the determination of whether a right is
substantial involves both a case-specific and a fact-specific inquiry.22
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has defined “substantial right” as a
“legal right affecting or involving a matter of substance as distinguished
from matters of form: a right materially affecting those interests which a
man is entitled to have preserved and protected by law: a material
right.”23 Some rights, or denials of rights, such as orders denying
arbitration24 and orders disqualifying counsel,25 almost always affect a
substantial right, and thus are immediately appealable.
B. Rule 54(b) Certification
The second most common exception to the rule precluding an
immediate appeal from an interlocutory order is a certification of the
merits order under Rule 54(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 54(b) states:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether
as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, or when
multiple parties are involved, the court may enter a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only if there is no
just reason for delay and it is so determined in the judgment. Such
judgment shall then be subject to review by appeal or as otherwise

19. Stafford v. Stafford, 515 S.E.2d 43, 45 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Goldston v.
Am. Motors Corp., 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (N.C. 1990)), aff’d, 520 S.E.2d 785 (N.C. 1999).
20. Blackwelder v. State Dep’t of Human Res., 299 S.E.2d 777, 780–81 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1983).
21. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(b)(3)(a) (2013).
22. See Oestreicher v. Am. Nat’l Stores, Inc., 225 S.E.2d 797, 805 (N.C. 1976)
(inquiring into the facts of the related causes of actions to determine whether a
substantial right was involved).
23. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY at 2280 (G. & C.
Merriam Co. 1971)).
24. Pineville Forest Homeowners Ass’n v. Portrait Homes Const. Co., 623 S.E.2d
620, 624 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Howard v. Oakwood Homes Corp., 516 S.E.2d
879, 881 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999)).
25. Ferguson v. DDP Pharmacy, Inc., 621 S.E.2d 323, 326 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005)
(citing Goldston v. Am. Motors Corp., 392 S.E.2d 735, 737 (N.C. 1990)).
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provided by these rules or other statutes. In the absence of entry of such
a final judgment, any order or other form of decision, however
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to
any of the claims or parties and shall not then be subject to review either
by appeal or otherwise except as expressly provided by these rules or
other statutes.26

The designation that the judgment is final and that there is no just
reason for delay is referred to as a “54(b) certification.”27 The certified
judgment is then immediately appealable to the intermediate appellate
court, even if there are still claims that require judicial determination by
the trial court and is, by definition, interlocutory.28 This exception
applies only to cases involving multiple parties or cases where one or
more claim is presented, because only in those cases can claims still be
pending after a judgment on the merits is ordered.29
The Rule 54(b) certification exception does not abrogate the other
exceptions allowed by statute for interlocutory appeals. Instead, it gives
parties an additional channel to pursue an immediate appeal from an
order that does not adjudicate all of the claims in the action.30 The other
exceptions identified in the North Carolina General Statutes sections 7A27(d) and 1-277, mentioned above, still apply if all of the requirements
of a Rule 54(b) certification are not met.31
Thus, the appeal permitted by Rule 54(b) is proper only if: (1) there
are multiple parties or claims for relief in the action; (2) the trial court
decides that there is no just reason for delaying an appeal; and (3) that
determination is evidenced in the judgment.32 A trial court cannot
simply decree its judgment a “final judgment” and make it immediately
appealable under the rule.33 The judgment must in fact be “final” for a
Rule 54(b) certification to apply, and appellate courts have the ability to
review whether the certified judgment is indeed final.34

26. N.C. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
27. See id.; see also First Atl. Mgmt. Corp. v. Dunlea Realty Co., 507 S.E.2d 56, 59
(N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
28. N.C. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
29. Id.
30. See Oestreicher v. Am. Nat’l Stores, Inc., 225 S.E.2d 797, 805 (N.C. 1976).
31. Id. (holding that the Rule 54(b) reference to “other statutes” specifically means
sections 1-277 and 7A-27(d)).
32. See N.C. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
33. Tridyn Indus., Inc. v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 251 S.E.2d 443, 447 (N.C. 1979).
34. Id.
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At first glance, it appears easy to determine if a judgment is certified
as final with the designation of no just reason for delaying an appeal. As
case law indicates, however, each word of the statute must be properly
interpreted and followed for an interlocutory appeal to be proper.
Questions often arise as to whether a judgment can be appealed from
when all of the substantive claims in the action have been adjudicated,
but a non-substantive claim, such as attorney’s fees, has been reserved
for later adjudication. The recent North Carolina appellate court
decisions that trace this particular issue are the focus of the following
Part. These decisions shed light on when a party can appeal from a
judgment if a pending claim for attorney’s fees remains.
II. IDEOLOGIES COLLIDE: BRIGHT-LINE RULE VERSUS
CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH
Courts sometimes look to other jurisdictions in deciding which
ideological approach to follow when determining whether a reserved
claim for attorney’s fees makes an appeal interlocutory.35 Generally,
there are two major ideological approaches: a bright-line rule or a caseby-case determination.
A. The Bright-Line Rule Approach
In the federal system, the Supreme Court of the United States
adopted a bright-line rule regarding pending statutory claims for
attorney’s fees in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co.36 The Court created
a “uniform rule that an unresolved issue of attorney’s fees for the
litigation in question does not prevent judgment on the merits from
being final.”37 It stated that the strict rule was the most practical
approach because it emphasized the importance of the “preservation of
operational consistency and predictability in the overall application of
[the federal appeal statutes].”38 The Court desired a system that required
fewer questions regarding whether a pending claim for attorney’s fees
was an issue of “merits” or “non-merits” and wanted attorneys and judges

35. See Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va. (Bumpers II), 695 S.E.2d 442, 446 (N.C.
2010) (citing multiple cases from other jurisdictions), abrogated by Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d
799, 800 (N.C. 2013).
36. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202–03 (1988).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 202.
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to be able to adequately understand and consistently apply appellate
rights.39
In Ray Haluch Gravel Co., the Court recently decided the question
of whether the bright-line rule of Budinich applies to contractual
attorney’s fees as well as statutory contract fees.40 The two cases had
“instructive similarities” because in both cases a trial court issued a
merits order and left an outstanding claim for attorney’s fees.41 Unlike in
Budinich, however, the attorney’s fees in Ray Haluch Gravel Co. were
based on a contractual agreement, not a statute.42 Despite this
difference, the Court held that attorney’s fees based on both statutory
and contractual authority are the same and that neither precludes a
merits order from being considered final.43 Keeping the continuity of
the precedent established in Budinich was a major factor for the Court
and there was “no reason to depart from [its] sound reasoning.”44 The
“operational consistency and predictability stressed in Budinich” kept the
federal landscape of final judgments clear and easy for both judges and
practitioners to understand.45
Although the bright-line rule is definitive and easy to understand,
the result is that cases are more likely to be appealed twice: first on the
merits order and then again on the order regarding the attorney’s fees
claim. The potential for multiple, piecemeal appeals is in tension with
the judicial policy of efficiency, which entails only hearing one appeal
per case. Further, multiple appeals can make the finality of a case
uncertain, not only for the court, but also for the parties involved.
Many jurisdictions, including North Carolina,46 have followed this
bright-line rule.47 Other states have decided that a different approach—
39. Id. at 202–03.
40. Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund of the Int’l Union of Operating
Eng’rs & Participating Emp’rs, 134 S. Ct. 773, 779–80 (2014).
41. Id. at 780.
42. Id.
43. Id. “Whether the claim for attorney’s fees is based on a statute, a contract, or
both, the pendency of a ruling on an award for fees and costs does not prevent, as a
general rule, the merits judgment from becoming final for purposes of appeal.” Id. at
777.
44. Id. at 780.
45. Id. See also Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202 (1988).
46. See Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d 799, 801 (N.C. 2013) (holding that an unresolved
claim for attorney’s fees does not prevent the merits order—the judgment resolving all
substantive issues of a claim—from being final, and therefore immediately appealable
under the statutes).
47. Bumpers II, 695 S.E.2d 442, 446 (N.C. 2010) (citing multiple cases from
Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Maryland, South Dakota, and
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the case-by-case approach, discussed below—is best and have concluded
that “a judgment on the merits is not final when an unresolved request
for attorney’s fees” is still pending.48
B. The Case-By-Case Approach
A case-by-case approach is the second major ideological approach
used to determine if a reserved claim for attorney’s fees prevents a
judgment from being final, and thus, immediately appealable.49 This
approach requires a court to analyze whether the pending attorney’s fees
request is closer to an “element of the substantive claim or merely an
item of costs that is contingent upon the resolution of the substantive
claim.”50 “If the claim for attorney’s fees is deemed an item of damages
or an element of the substantive claim,” then the merits judgment is not
considered final and, therefore, is not appealable until the pending claim
for attorney’s fees is resolved.51 In contrast, if the claim for attorney’s
fees is an item of costs or contingent upon prevailing on the merits of
the substantive claim, the merits judgment is immediately appealable
notwithstanding the pending claim for attorney’s fees.52 A minority of
jurisdictions—including North Carolina prior to Duncan53—follow this
case-by-case approach.54
Although the case-by-case approach is not as definitive as the
bright-line rule, it has its benefits. The case-by-case approach allows
judges to research and discern the relationship between governing
common law or the relevant statute and the appeal for attorney’s fees.
By understanding this relationship in cases where judges conclude that

Washington that have all followed the Supreme Court’s bright-line rule that an
unresolved claim for attorney’s fees does not prevent a judgment from being final),
abrogated by Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d at 800.
48. Id. (citing cases from Nebraska, Ohio, and Utah that have held that a judgment
on the merits is not final if there is still a pending claim for attorney’s fees).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 447.
52. Id.
53. Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d 799, 800 (N.C. 2013).
54. Bumpers II, 695 S.E.2d at 447 (citing multiple cases from Colorado, Wisconsin,
and North Carolina that concluded whether the merits judgment was final was based on
the relatedness of the claim for attorney’s fees to the substantive claim). Although North
Carolina had not explicitly stated that it followed a case-by-case approach, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina stated, “our Court of Appeals has engaged in a de facto case-bycase approach [by] sometimes dismissing appeals having unresolved fee issues and
sometimes hearing such appeals.” Id.
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attorney’s fees are an element of the substantive claim, they may
properly resolve the case with only a single appeal. This approach can,
therefore, lower the number of multiple appeals within a single case
because if the claim for attorney’s fees is so related that it should be
litigated prior to appeal, then the parties are limited to a single appeal.55
This approach promotes the traditional goal of efficiency in appellate
procedure.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE LANDSCAPE IN NORTH CAROLINA:
FROM BUMPERS TO HAUSLE
After all of the substantive claims of an action have been decided
and a party has won, the prevailing party will often move for payment of
attorney’s fees from the losing party.56 The losing party, however, may
have filed a notice of appeal from the judgment on the merits before the
judge reached the issue of attorney’s fees. Is an appeal in this context
proper? Is the order adjudicating only the merits a “final order,”
allowing for the possibility of a Rule 54(b) certification? If so, what does
that mean for the claim for attorneys’ fees?
The answers to these questions have not always been consistent in
North Carolina. Recently, however, the North Carolina appellate courts
have taken strides to clarify some of the confusion and to establish a test
for attorneys and judges alike to determine if an appeal is appropriate
when a claim for attorney’s fees is pending.
A. Bumpers v. Community Bank of Northern Virginia
The issue of whether an appeal is appropriate when a claim for
attorney’s fees is pending came to the modern forefront in North
Carolina in Bumpers v. Community Bank of Northern Virginia (Bumpers
II).57 There, the plaintiff (Bumpers) filed a lawsuit alleging that the
defendant (Community Bank) was liable under section 75-1.1 of the
55. See id.
56. The enactment of section 6-21.6 of the North Carolina General Statutes will only
increase the frequency with which a party will move for attorney’s fees. N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 6-21.6 (2013). This enactment involves reciprocal attorney’s fees in business contracts
and allows parties to agree to shift the responsibility for attorney’s fees by contract
instead of relying on the “evidence of indebtedness” of section 6-21.2. Id. § 6-21.2; see
also Beth Scherer, U.S. Supreme Court: Undecided Contract-Based Attorneys’ Fees Motion
Does Not Toll Deadline For Filing Notice of Appeal, N.C. APP. PRAC. BLOG (Jan. 20, 2014),
http://www.ncapb.com/2014/01/20/u-s-supreme-court-undecided-contractually-basedattorneys-fees-motion-does-not-toll-deadline-for-filing-notice-of-appeal/.
57. Bumpers II, 695 S.E.2d at 443.
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North Carolina General Statutes for violating North Carolina’s Unfair
and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTP).58 Bumpers alleged that after
responding to an advertisement for a second mortgage from Community
Bank, Community Bank charged “duplicative closing fees for overlapping
services” and other unreasonable and unnecessary fees in violation of the
statute.59 Bumpers also requested attorney’s fees in relation to the UDTP
violation, pursuant to section 75-16.1.60
The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of
Bumpers and found Community Bank liable on two of his section 75-1.1
claims for “systematic overcharging” and duplicative “origination fees.”61
Upon Bumpers’ request, the trial court certified the order under Rule
54(b), specifically noting that “it had not considered an application for
attorney fees under [section] 75-16.1, but nonetheless determine[d] that
there is no just cause for delay and that the judgment resulting from this
order should be entered as a final judgment.”62 The order further stated
that the issue of attorney’s fees would be considered “separately.”63
On appeal, the court of appeals relied on Tridyn Industries v.
American Mutual Insurance Co.64 in holding that the attorney’s fees of a
UDTP claim are considered part of the court costs and are ancillary to
the section 75-1.1 claim.65 Therefore, the court concluded that “[i]t was
improper for the trial court to certify its order as final as to a claim
without first assessing attorney’s fees and other costs.”66
When Bumpers II reached the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the
court distinguished the facts from those in Tridyn Industries.67 It stated
that here, as opposed to the partial summary judgment order in Tridyn
Industries, all of the substantive issues of the UDTP claim had been
adjudicated, “leaving only the issue of attorney’s fees.”68 The supreme
court created a “bright-line rule that an unresolved claim for attorney
58. Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (2009)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 443–44; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16.1.
61. Bumpers II, 695 S.E.2d at 444.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Tridyn Indus. v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 251 S.E.2d 443, 444 (N.C. 1979) (holding
that a partial summary judgment on the issue of liability that leaves the issue of damages
to be determined later is not immediately appealable).
65. Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va. (Bumpers I), 675 S.E.2d 697, 700 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2009).
66. Id.
67. Bumpers II, 695 S.E.2d at 446 (citing Tridyn Indus., 251 S.E.2d at 448).
68. Id.
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fees under section 75-16.1 does not preclude finality of a judgment
resolving all substantive issues of a claim under section 75-1.1.”69 In
sum, Bumpers II stands for the proposition that a ruling on all
substantive claims under the UDTP statute is a “final judgment” that can
be certified and, therefore, immediately appealed from under Rule 54(b),
even if the issue of attorney’s fees remains unresolved.70
The court adopted a bright-line rule because it believed such a rule
would most effectively “promote judicial efficiency [and] foster
meaningful appellate review,” while avoiding “waiver of appellate
rights.”71 Before reaching this succinct rule, however, the court analyzed
the case-by-case approach, which requires a court to determine if the
attorney’s fees are best “characterized as an element of the substantive
claim or merely an item of costs that is contingent” upon the requesting
party prevailing on the substantive claim.72
In this case-by-case approach, “if the claim for attorney’s fees is
deemed an item of damages or an element of the substantive claim, the
judgment on the merits is not final and appealable until the attorney fees
request is resolved.”73 But, if the attorney’s fees claim is simply an item
of costs, like that of section 75-16.1, or is contingent upon the
requesting party prevailing on the merits of the substantive claim, then
“a final judgment on the substantive claim is independently appealable,”
even if the attorney’s fees claim has not been resolved.74 This analysis
was important because, even though the court declared a bright-line rule
for section 75-1.1 violations and the pursuant attorney’s fees claim, the
court also used a case-by-case approach to determine that attorney’s fees
are not part of the substantive claim.75

69. Id. at 448.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 446.
73. Id. at 447 (citing In re Marriage of Hill, 166 P.3d 269, 271–72 (Colo. App. 2007)
(holding that “final orders in a divorce proceeding that resolved property division and
awarded spousal and child support but failed to resolve a statutory attorney fee claim
were not appealable because the fee claim was ‘inextricably intertwined’ with other issues
in the case”)).
74. Id. (citing Ferrell v. Glenwood Brokers, Ltd., 848 P.2d 936, 941–42 (Colo.
1993)).
75. Id. at 448 (“[W]e briefly examine [section] 75–16.1 to determine how it
interrelates with a judgment on the merits of a claim under [section] 75–1.1 for purposes
of appeal.”).
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Therefore, the court held that the merits order was independently
appealable because it was properly certified under Rule 54(b).76 This
approach, though clear for the section 75-1.1 category of cases, left
courts with little guidance as to how to proceed when other types of
claims were presented. Was the substantive order resolving the merits of
the claim appealable because it was final, or because the order in the case
had in fact been certified under Rule 54(b)?77 In other words, the court
failed to resolve whether an order resolving the substantive claims but
leaving the issue of “non-substantive” attorney’s fees had to be certified
under Rule 54(b) to be appealed from. That question would arise in
future cases, beginning with Lucas v. Lucas.78
B. Lucas v. Lucas
In Lucas v. Lucas, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina applied a
Bumpers II-style case-by-case determination, but skirted the issue of
whether certification under Rule 54(b) was required to perform that
analysis.79 The Lucas case involved claims for divorce from bed and
board, post-separation support, alimony, equitable distribution, and
attorney’s fees.80 The trial court resolved the substantive claims for
alimony and equitable distribution, but left unresolved the claim for
attorney’s fees.81 The order stated that it “[was] certified as a final
judgment pursuant to [R]ule 54(b).”82
On appeal, the court held that when there is no specific finding in
the merits order that “there is no just reason for delay,” as required by
Rule 54(b), the appellate court “does not have jurisdiction to hear an
interlocutory appeal under Rule 54(b).”83 The court concluded that the
Rule 54(b) certification was defective because the order did not
specifically state that “there is no just reason for delay” of the appeal.84
Therefore, some other basis for appellate jurisdiction must exist in order

76. Id. at 448–49.
77. Id. at 448 (“[W]e hold that an order or judgment ruling on all substantive issues
of a claim under section 75-1.1 is a final judgment that may be certified and appealed
pursuant to Rule 54(b), notwithstanding any unresolved issue of attorney fees under
section 75-16.1.”).
78. Lucas v. Lucas, 706 S.E.2d 270 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
79. See id. at 274
80. Id. at 272.
81. Id. at 273.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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for the court to hear the appeal.85 Instead of looking into whether
another basis for jurisdiction—i.e., exception to the prohibition of
interlocutory appeals—was present in this case, the court relied on
Bumpers II to conclude that appellate jurisdiction existed.86
The court interpreted the holding in Bumpers II to mean that the
court “adopted a new rule for determining whether an appeal may
proceed when the only remaining claim is one for attorneys’ fees.”87 This
contradicted the precedent that “an appeal from an alimony order must
be dismissed as interlocutory” when an attorney’s fees claim is still
pending.88 The court stated that the supreme court in Bumpers II
“specifically rejected the case-by-case approach in favor of a ‘bright-line
rule’” where the finality of the order was determined by whether the
attorney’s fees claim is a substantive issue as part of the merits.89 Under
this interpretation of Bumpers II, the court concluded that a claim for
attorney’s fees under the statute governing alimony “is contingent upon
the claimant prevailing on [the merits of] the alimony claim,” thus,
attorney’s fees are “not a substantive issue, or in any way part of the
merits of [an alimony] claim.”90 Therefore, the court held that an
unresolved claim for attorney’s fees under section 50-16.4 of the North
Carolina General Statues did not preclude the trial court from
determining that the merits order was final and that the appeal was
properly before the court.91
The court in Lucas, however, misinterpreted the “bright-line rule” of
Bumpers II. The Bumpers II bright-line rule dealt with an unresolved
claim for attorney’s fees under a UDTP claim.92 The rule emerged after
the court determined that the claim for attorney’s fees was ancillary to
the UDTP claim.93 The rule, as stated in Bumpers II, was simply a caseby-case determination of whether attorney’s fees are ancillary to the

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing Webb v. Webb, 677 S.E.2d 462, 465 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (holding
that an appeal from an alimony order must be dismissed as interlocutory when there is
still an unresolved claim for attorney’s fees)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 274 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50–16.3A (2009); Bumpers II, 695 S.E.2d
442, 448 (N.C. 2010), abrogated by Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d 799 (N.C. 2013)).
91. Id.
92. See Bumpers II, 695 S.E.2d at 444; see also supra notes 57–66 and accompanying
text.
93. See Bumpers II, 695 S.E.2d at 446–48.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2014

13

4. FUSSELL 3.28.14

3/28/2014 12:41 PM

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 4

352

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:339

substantive claim;94 it was not an all-encompassing bright-line rule as the
Lucas court stated.95 Along with the misinterpretation of the Bumpers II
rule, the Lucas court also found that appellate review was proper.96 The
court decided the merits of the appeal without first finding that appellate
jurisdiction existed by a proper certification under Rule 54(b) or that the
order affected a substantial right of the party.97
Although the Lucas court relied on Bumpers II to create a new path
to determine how a claim for attorney’s fees affects the finality of a
judgment, Bumpers II did not provide that separate channel to obtain
appellate jurisdiction.98 In Hausle v. Hausle, the court of appeals later
described the Lucas court’s analysis as “circumvent[ing] the general rule
prohibiting an appeal of an interlocutory judgment, unless the judgment
is certified or affects a substantial right, so as to reach the merits by
applying the Bumpers analysis to determine whether a claim for attorney
fees precluded finality of the judgment.”99
C. Duncan v. Duncan
Case law regarding appellate review of an order reserving a pending
claim for attorney’s fees continued to develop following Bumpers II and
Lucas. Although the focus of the next Part is the decision of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina in Duncan v. Duncan (Duncan II),100 a
brief overview of the case as decided by the court of appeals (Duncan I)
is discussed first.101
The merits order in Duncan I involved equitable distribution and
alimony.102 The trial court entered an order requiring the defendant to
pay alimony to the plaintiff, but it did not resolve the claim for attorney’s
fees, which was reserved for another hearing.103 The trial court did not
certify the merits order that resolved the substantive issues under Rule
54(b) for immediate appeal.104 On appeal, the court of appeals stated
that in previous decisions there had been “uncertainty concerning the
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See id.
Lucas, 706 S.E.2d at 273.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 273–74.
Hausle v. Hausle, 739 S.E.2d 203, 207 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
Id.
Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d 799 (N.C. 2013).
Duncan v. Duncan (Duncan I), 732 S.E.2d 390 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012).
Id. at 391.
Id.
Id. at 392.
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scope of the holding in Bumpers II.”105 It also specifically noted that the
“bright-line rule” from Bumpers II applied only to violations of the UDTP
statute.106 The court held that although the analysis from Bumpers II
(regarding whether the claim for attorney’s fees was a substantive claim)
may apply beyond the scope of UDTP claims, “we need not address the
full applicability of Bumpers II to the facts in the present case because the
trial court [here] did not certify the order for immediate appeal, as
required by Bumpers II.”107
The court in Duncan I attempted to clarify what was left to be
determined after Bumpers II and further confused by Lucas. The court
clarified that in Bumpers II, the supreme court held, “the appeal before it
was interlocutory but that the appeal was proper because the trial court
had certified the order for immediate appeal.”108 The certification under
Rule 54(b) was dispositive in determining if the appeal was
appropriate.109 The court in Duncan I all but explicitly stated that the
Lucas court misinterpreted the holding in Bumpers II.110
The North Carolina appellate courts were beginning to clarify the
issues regarding final judgments and pending claims for attorney’s fees.
While the courts answered some of the questions created by Bumpers II,
this area of appellate jurisdiction was about to get even more muddled
with the holding in Hausle v. Hausle.111
D. Hausle v. Hausle
In Hausle v. Hausle, the trial court entered an order denying the
plaintiff’s motion to modify the custody order, but it reserved its
decision on the issues of modification of child support, contempt, and
attorney’s fees for a future proceeding.112 Notably, it did not certify its
order for immediate appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b).113

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Hausle v. Hausle, 739 S.E.2d 203, 208 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Duncan I,
732 S.E.2d 390).
110. See Duncan I, 732 S.E.2d at 392 (emphasizing that the court has faced
uncertainty regarding the scope of the holding in Bumpers II).
111. See Hausle, 739 S.E.2d at 208 (acknowledging that the law is unclear “regarding
the finality of an order or judgment which preserves an issue of attorney fees”).
112. Id. at 205.
113. Id. at 206.
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The court of appeals attempted to clarify when an appeal from a
merits order is appropriate if a claim for attorney’s fees is still pending.114
First, the court reviewed past cases discussing whether an appeal from a
child custody order that affects a substantial right is properly before the
appellate court.115 After analyzing the substantial right issues for child
custody, the court determined that the plaintiff failed to make the initial
showing that a substantial right had in fact been affected.116 The court
further stated that although the substantial right “analysis would
ordinarily suffice to determine that the appeal is interlocutory[,]” and
thus improper, “because recent case law has complicated the issue,
further discussion is necessary.”117 Accordingly, the court discussed the
cases analyzed above, attempting to synthesize the decisions.118
The court admitted that the law regarding the finality of an order
that has an unresolved claim for attorney’s fees is “not a model of clarity”
and that it was “difficult to reconcile Lucas with the general prohibition
against the immediate appeal of interlocutory appeals.”119 Following the
holding in Duncan I, the court dismissed the appeal as interlocutory
because the merits order was not certified pursuant to Rule 54(b).120
The court determined that the holding in Duncan I, which followed the
rule of Bumpers II, was more consistent with established case law
regarding interlocutory appeals.121
Although the Hausle opinion itself was no “model of clarity,” it
appeared to establish that a proper Rule 54(b) certification is required
when a trial court issues an order deciding the merits of a case but
reserving the issue of attorney’s fees for a future hearing. Thus, under
Hausle, an order is immediately appealable and properly before the court
of appeals if:
(1) the order fully resolved the merits of the claim, leaving only
attorney’s fees to be determined;
(2) the claim for attorney’s fees depended on the party prevailing on the
merits and was not an element of the substantive claim; and
(3) the trial court properly certified the order under Rule 54(b).122

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 206–08.
Id. at 208.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Hausle opinion was a way for the court to clarify the conflicting
decisions and finally affirm that in order to appeal from a merits order,
the order must be properly certified under Rule 54(b). But, just as that
step in the test was finalized, the requirements set forth in Hausle were
jeopardized when the Supreme Court of North Carolina granted
certiorari in Duncan II,123 discussed next.
IV. FINALITY IN DUNCAN II: THE SUPERFLUOUS 54(B) CERTIFICATION
The supreme court’s opinion in Duncan II swiftly changed the rules
regarding the finality of judgment orders. The opinion opened with a
strong statement of purpose: “Today, we clarify the effect of an
unresolved request for attorney’s fees on an appeal from an order that
otherwise fully determines the action.”124
The court of appeals had already concluded in Duncan I and Hausle
that certification was required for an appeal to be proper, however, the
defendant in Duncan II argued for a change in this rule.125 In his brief,
the Defendant argued that the confusion surrounding the issue of the
finality and appealability of an order when there is a pending claim for
attorney’s fees should be resolved by a clear rule in order to reduce
jurisdictional consequences, such as waiver of rights.126 The Defendant
contended that North Carolina should follow the majority of other
jurisdictions that have tracked the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States by providing a bright-line rule regarding the appealability
of pending attorney’s fees.127 The Defendant urged the Supreme Court of
North Carolina to conclude that an unresolved claim for attorney’s fees
should not change the finality of a merits order that would hinder
immediate appealability.128
The court agreed with the Defendant, succinctly holding that an
unresolved request for attorney’s fees does not prevent a judgment on
the merits from being considered final for the purposes of an appeal,
123. Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d 799, 800 (N.C. 2013).
124. Id.
125. See supra notes 100–23; Petition for Discretionary Review at 3–7, Duncan II, 742
S.E.2d 799 (N.C. 2013) (No. 450 PA12), 2012 WL 5509760 at *3–7.
126. Petition for Discretionary Review, supra note 125, at *3–4.
127. Id. at *15–16 (citing Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199–
203 (1988) (“Courts and litigants are best served by the bright-line rule, which accords
with traditional understanding, that a decision on the merits is a ‘final decision’ for
purposes of [section] 1291 whether or not there remains for adjudication a request for
attorney’s fees attributable to the case.”)).
128. Id. at *1–6.
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following the lead of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Budinich.129 “Because attorney’s fees and costs are collateral to a final
judgment on the merits, an unresolved request for attorney’s fees and
costs does not render interlocutory an appeal” from the merits order.130
“Once the trial court enters an order that decides all substantive claims,
the right to appeal commences.”131 This rule is truly a “bright-line rule,”
similar to the one the court attempted to adopt in Bumpers II.132
The court decided that “[b]ecause an order resolving all substantive
claims is a final judgment, Rule 54(b) certification is superfluous, and
such a final order is immediately appealable as of right.”133 Therefore,
when a trial court order adjudicates all of the substantive claims, leaving
only the issue of attorney’s fees for a later proceeding, the party wishing
to appeal does not have to seek a Rule 54(b) certification in order to
immediately appeal because the order is considered final.134 As
discussed in the first Part, a final order from a trial court is immediately
appealable as a matter of right.135
The court cleared up the confusion from the previous cases by
holding that the bright-line rule applies to every case where a trial court
enters a judgment on the merits but an unresolved issue of attorney’s
fees remains.136 It also stated: “To promote clarity and uniformity, we
disavow any language in [Bumpers II] that may be read to conflict with
our holding in the case at hand.”137 In other words, there is no longer
any reason for a court to determine whether the claim for attorney’s fees
is contingent upon a party prevailing on the merits in order to decide if
the pending claim for attorney’s fees is immediately appealable.138 The
test from Bumpers II regarding whether the attorney’s fees claim is an
129. Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d at 800; see also Budinich, 486 U.S. at 199.
130. Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d at 800.
131. Id.
132. Id.; see also Bumpers II, 695 S.E.2d 442, 448 (N.C. 2010), abrogated by Duncan II,
742 S.E.2d 799, 800 (N.C. 2013).
133. Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d at 800 (emphasis added) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ l–
277(a), 7A–27(c) (2011)).
134. Id.
135. Veazey v. City of Durham, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (N.C. 1950).
136. Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d at 800–01.
137. Id. at 801.
138. Id.; see also Matt Leerberg, Attorneys’ Fees are Ancillary, and That’s Final, N.C.
APP. PRAC. BLOG (June 13, 2013), http://www.ncapb.com/2013/06/13/attorneys-fees-areancillary-and-thats-final/. Leerberg summarizes: “This ‘bright-line rule’ goes a long way
to cut through the confusion on this issue. Note what is missing from the analysis: you
do NOT have to analyze whether the attorneys’ fees issue is dependent on or ancillary to
the final merits order.” Leerberg, supra.
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element of the substantive claim or simply a cost added by the court is
no longer necessary, according to Duncan II.139
The Duncan II opinion was invaluable and arguably the best
decision for the court to make, especially considering the confusing
landscape of the previous case law and the trend by other jurisdictions to
follow the bright-line rule. This bright-line rule provides the easiest test
for both practitioners and judges to understand and apply.140
Practitioners and judges no longer have to examine the controlling
statute and the trial court order to determine if the attorney’s fees are an
element of the substantive claim before knowing whether the appeal is
immediately available. The risk of filing an untimely appeal is
substantially lessened. Attorneys no longer face the possibility of their
untimely appeals being summarily dismissed and then being
embarrassed in front of the judiciary, the bar, or their clients.
Despite the growing clarity, Duncan II still leaves some problems
and unanswered questions. For example, now that an order resolving all
claims is final and an immediate appeal is a right of the party, there is a
chance that a case may have multiple appeals. An aggrieved party will
likely file for an appeal following the merits order because it will not
want to risk waiving its appellate rights by waiting too long. The merits
order would be considered final and could be appealed from under
Duncan II.141 If there is an unresolved claim for attorney’s fees, however,
the party may have to appeal again following the resolution of the
attorney’s fees claim. Longstanding case law has sought to limit
fragmented or partial appeals,142 yet, this new bright-line rule easily
opens the door for a case to be appealed multiple times.
A simple answer to this problem may be to ask the judge to delay
entering a merits order until the attorney’s fees claim is decided.143
Thus, only one order would be entered in each case and only one appeal
would be needed to decide both the substantive claims and the attorney’s
fees claim, eliminating the risk of fragmented or piecemeal appeals.144
However, with crowded dockets, the claim for attorney’s fees may not be
decided for months, leaving parties in a limbo state of no judgment at

139. Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d at 801; see also Bumpers II, 695 S.E.2d 442, 448 (N.C.
2010), abrogated by Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d 799, 800 (N.C. 2013).
140. See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202 (1988) (explaining
that “Courts and litigants are best served by the bright-line rule”).
141. See Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d at 801.
142. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text.
143. See Leerberg, supra note 138.
144. See id.
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all. This may be especially problematic for family law issues where
remedies may not be money damages, but instead parental rights.
The circumstances under which a trial court can hear a motion for
attorney’s fees after a party has filed a notice of appeal remain unclear
under Duncan II.145 A question arises from the language of North
Carolina General Statutes section 1-294, which states “[w]hen an appeal
is perfected . . . it stays all further proceedings in the court below upon
the judgment appealed from, or upon the matter embraced therein; but
the court below may proceed upon any other matter included in the
action and not affected by the judgment appealed from.”146 This leaves
judges and practitioners to wonder if the analysis from Bumpers II and
Hausle regarding the relationship between the judgment appealed from
and the pending claim for attorney’s fees may still need to be considered
in the appealability analysis.147
CONCLUSION
After years of confusing and contradictory rulings, Duncan II
followed the lead of the federal courts and many other jurisdictions by
creating a bright-line rule to determine the effect of an appeal when an
unresolved claim for attorney’s fees remains.148 Now, it is established
that attorney’s fees are ancillary to an order that adjudicates all other
claims, and thus, a merits order is immediately appealable. This change
in the legal landscape, although still leaving some questions to be
answered, not only cleared up the confusion from previous cases, but it
also provided clear instructions regarding what is necessary to determine
if an appeal is appropriate. Because of this new clarity, practitioners and
judges no longer need to spend time determining if a claim for attorney’s
fees is ancillary to the substantive claims. Instead, North Carolina now
follows the majority of jurisdictions that apply the bright-line rule of
Budinich.
Lauren Fussell

145. See id.
146. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-294 (2013).
147. See Leerberg, supra note 138 (analyzing section 1-294 and stating that “the
Hausle court’s inquiry into the relatedness of the merits order and the attorney’s fee
motion may be alive and well”).
148. See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202 (1988).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol36/iss2/4

20

